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1. Introduction 
 In recent years a body of literature has emerged analyzing the impact of 
international labor mobility on wage distribution in the source country.  In particular, this 
literature addresses the question how emigration of skilled and unskilled labor from low 
wage to high wage countries affects the degree of wage inequality in the low wage 
country.  Marjit and Kar (2005) provide a simple model and derive an intuitively 
appealing condition under which wage distribution may go against the residual workers 
of the emigrating group.  Using a specific factor model, this study shows that regardless 
of the emigrating category – skilled or unskilled – return to capital declines following 
emigration and subsequently raises the return for workers of the non-emigrating type. 
Indeed, in some cases residual members of the non-emigrating factor may benefit 
more than the emigrating group affecting wage inequality in an unexpected manner.  
Thus, emigration of either skill type may unambiguously improve the relative wage of the 
non-emigrating workers.  Following Marjit and Kar (2005) several papers have extended 
this emigration-wage inequality link and provided valuable insights.  For example, Oladi 
and Beladi (2007) introduce non-traded goods in connection with emigration of skilled 
and unskilled workers from a small open economy and evaluate its impact on both source 
and host countries.  In particular, they show that immigration of both skilled and 
unskilled labor decreases skilled and unskilled real wages in the recipient country with 
wage gap widened (reduced) due to unskilled (skilled) immigration, if the non-traded 
sector is less capital intensive than the import competing sector.  Individual wage 
implications are reversed for the source country with respect to both migrating types, but 
subject to the intensity assumption only one type would exacerbate the extent of 
 3
inequality.  In a related context, Beladi, Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2008) introduce 
unemployment of unskilled workers in a developing country and derive conditions under 
which inflow of skilled and unskilled workers may reduce wage inequality.  However, it 
is not consistent with the true migration patterns where the net outflow of either type is 
positive and large for developing countries.  Except for refugee movements (primarily 
unskilled) and MNC or intergovernmental movements (primarily skilled) it is unlikely 
that such inflow is positive and would have much of an impact on wage gaps in poor 
countries.  
Utilizing the role played by external economies of scale, particularly in the 
service sector in middle income and newly industrialized countries, Anwar (2006) 
however, provides a much more convincing analysis of the unambiguous increase in 
wage inequality.  The paper shows that emigration of unskilled labor must increase wage 
inequality if the income share of capital in the industrial sector is larger than the service 
sector and a condition involving output elasticity of factors of production and cost 
elasticity of factor prices, is positive.  Using a similar framework, Anwar (2009) further 
shows that downsizing increases the varieties produced by the service sector and that in 
turn raises skilled wage leaving unskilled wage unchanged.1 Furthermore, in case of 
developed countries Oda and Stapp (2009) show that simultaneous inflow of skilled and 
unskilled labor and capital can cause wage inequality in favor of the skilled.                             
These and various other issues that wage inequality spawned by factor mobility 
discussed so far necessitate a synthetic analysis.  We therefore offer a model with greater 
generality within which many of these results should hold.  In addition, we demonstrate 
that factor mobility can be critically responsible for ‘vanishing’ sectors in the source 
                                                 
1
 For implications of immigration on welfare in an identical set up see, Anwar (2008).    
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country.   
Between two alternative occupations a factor will always choose the one that 
promises higher rate of return.  As factors of production are allowed free entry and exit in 
a global space the general lesson from trade theory suggests that the set of goods 
produced in a country may change along with that.  In particular, given world prices 
certain production activities/services might turn out to be unprofitable for certain 
countries.  Such ‘finite’ changes in trade theory do not receive much attention but surely 
opens up interesting possibilities.  Recently, Jones (1996) and Jones and Findlay (2007, 
Letters) have considered implications of vanishing sectors in a different context.  Finite 
changes typically refer to circumstances when the output contraction is fairly drastic.  
Jones and Marjit (1992) provide an interesting perspective in a many factor many 
commodity world.  In specific factor models (Jones, 1971) no sector can completely 
vanish because of the necessity of employing the specific factor.  Of course, they do not 
consider the possibility that such specific factor is internationally mobile.                             
In a standard Heckscher-Ohlin framework with two factors, however, a vanishing sector 
is clearly feasible under complete specialization. 
 This paper considers a 3 X 3 model where two sectors produce X and Y by using 
skilled and unskilled labor as specific factors and capital as the mobile factor as in Marjit 
and Kar (2005).  There is a third sector that produces Z by using both types of labor and 
capital.  Sectors X and Y may be identified as purely skilled and unskilled sector 
respectively, owing to proportionately greater use of the specific factors, while Z is the 
common good.  Existence of the third sector allows participation of both types of labor in 
one activity and thus captures a more realistic scenario by broadening the spectrum of 
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analysis.  In the Marjit and Kar (2005) specific-factor type framework emigration of 
either type of labor must improve the real wage of both while the owners of capital 
suffer, such that wage inequality or wage distribution is the key focus. 
 Introduction of the third sector, as in this model, opens up several other 
possibilities unaccounted for thus far.  Interestingly, emigration in this structure may lead 
to closure of one of the sectors and reduce the 3 X 3 structure to a 2 X 3 system where 
only two commodities/services are produced henceforth with one specific and one non-
specific factor remaining functional within the country.  For example, emigration of 
skilled workers may shut down sector X completely not only because such workers 
become too costly to hire but also because capital flight to Z replaces skilled workers 
there as well.  We establish conditions under which this lowers the unskilled wage, an 
outcome never to be encountered in structures without a mixed sector.  Two possibilities 
are worth mentioning under such circumstances.  One, this might perpetuate the flight of 
skilled workers.  Two, it exacerbates wage inequality as consistent with empirical 
observations in developing countries.  The same story can be repeated in case of 
emigration of unskilled workers with the endogenous production structure being 
instrumental in driving the distributional consequences in both cases.   
 The second section describes the model and pre-emigration and post-emigration 
equilibria.  The third discusses the emergence of alternative production structures and 
their implications for wages and wage inequality.  The last section offers concluding 
remarks.   
 
2. Model and Equilibrium 
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 To start with we have a 3 X 3 model for a small open economy trading only in 
goods.  X uses skilled labor and capital while Y uses unskilled labor and capital.  Z uses 
both skilled and unskilled labor and capital.  Technology is neo-classical with 
diminishing marginal productivity and CRS, markets are competitive and resources are 
fully employed.  Following equations describe the model and use conventional symbols.   
XKXSXS Praaw =+                    (1) 
YKYLY Prawa =+                           (2) 
 ZKZLZSZS Prawaaw =++                  (3) 
SZaXa SZSX =+                                       (4) 
LZaYa LZLY =+      (5) 
KZaYaXa KZKYKX =++                           (6) 
Six equations above determine Sw , r, w, ZandYX , ; where niwwaa njijijij ≠= );/( , 
given commodity prices ZYX PandPP , and  factor endowments S, L and K.     
 Now consider a situation where only skilled labor emigrates from the poor source 
country as domestic wage is lower than that in the richer destination country, *SS ww < .  
Therefore, with sufficient emigration Sw rises up to 
*
Sw and is held fixed there in post-
migration equilibrium.  Since the economy is also small in the factor market, this implies 
one less variable, Sw and one less unit cost – unit price equality condition, namely 
equation (4) since S is not binding any longer.  The new system solves for 5 variables 
from 5 equations.   
 However, the new SS ww >
* can lead to alternative production structures.  We can 
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not rule out zero production for one of the sectors as goods outnumber factors of 
production under the changed scenario.  Therefore any two competitive price equations 
can solve for the remaining endogenous factor prices rendering the third competitive 
price equation redundant.  In the redundant equation, if the unit cost (left hand side in any 
equation 1-3) exceeds the unit price (corresponding right hand side) the commodity 
becomes unviable under perfect competition and the sector vanishes.  Conversely, if the 
unit cost in that sector becomes lower than the price then one of the factor returns must 
rise in equilibrium and should suck in that factor from other sectors.  This too will 
jeopardize production in one or both sectors in the intersection set.  Consequently, the 
exact match between average cost and price for the potentially vanishing sector has a 
probability of measure zero.  Let us now look at the alternative scenarios that can 
emerge.2 
 
3. Post-Emigration Production Structure  
 Consider solving r from (1) and (2) given *SS ww = and denote it as, 
)( **1 Swfr =      (7) 
Alternatively we can solve for r from (2) and (3) and call it, 
)( **2 Swr φ=      (8) 
First, suppose *2
*
1 rr > ; then Z will not be produced.  All capital will be absorbed in X and 
Y.  All skilled labor will go in X and all the unskilled in Y.  Note that, in the process as 
SS ww >
*
, r must have fallen and w must have gone up.  This is the model Marjit and Kar 
                                                 
2
 Jones and Marjit (1992) discuss such finite changes in production structure in a multi-sector multi-variety 
trade model and prove a post-trade convergence property.  Also see Jones (1996) and Findlay and Jones 
(2000).  
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(2005) have worked with.  Here, the non-production in sector Z and subsequent impact of 
emigration on wage distribution across skill types, is an endogenous outcome and renders 
the results in Marjit and Kar (2005) a special case within this generalized structure. 
 Second, consider *2
*
1 rr <  at 
*
SS ww = .  In this case, all capital will have a 
tendency to flow into the production of Y and Z, such that, all skilled workers who did not 
migrate will be forced to join sector Z, while the unskilled remain both in Y and Z.   
 A third, and starker, possibility emerges when only sector Z remains functional 
and sectors X and Y both vanish.  Note that, with X and Y set to zero equation (3) alone 
can not determine w and r even if *SS ww = .  Here we need the full-employment 
conditions to solve for w and r.  So, equations (3), (5) and (6) simultaneously solve for w, 
r and z.  We shall refrain from addressing this possibility because our intention is to offer 
a striking contrast to the already established result that emigration of one type of labor 
always helps the other non-emigrating type.  The second structure shall prove to be 
sufficient for demonstrating our claim.   
 Consider the case where emigration of skilled labor leads to closure of sector X, 
and that Y and Z are the only products.  Therefore, to derive the effect of such a change 
on w and r, we use Jones (1965).  The following equations incorporate proportional 
changes in the variables denoted by ‘^’.  From (2) and (3) using envelope condition, we 
get,          
    
0ˆˆ =+ KYLY rw θθ     (9) 
And,   SZSKZLZ wrw θθθ ˆˆˆ −=+    (10) 
So,    
KYLZKZLY
KYSZSww
θθθθ
θθ
−
=
ˆ
ˆ
   (11) 
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Such that, 0)(,0ˆ
<
>
−
<
>
KYLZKZLYiffw θθθθ    (12) 
Note that, as *SS ww = in the post migration regime, 0ˆ >Sw , and sij 'θ are income shares 
of each factor in the jth industry.  (12) suggests the usual Stolper-Samuelson conjecture 
that for w to increase, sector Y must be labor intensive.  Viewed differently, emigration of 
skilled workers imposes a tax on the capital intensive sector.  Therefore we can construct 
the following proposition. 
 
Proposition I: Emigration of skilled labor must reduce the wage rate of the 
unskilled workers iff the mixed sector, i.e., sector Z is labor 
intensive. 
Proof: See above discussion. 
 
  Similarly, if unskilled labor alone emigrates and the production structure reduces 
to sectors X and Z only, the wage implication for the skilled workers is available from the 
following equation. 
KXSZKZSX
KXLZ
S
w
w
θθθθ
θθ
−
=
ˆ
ˆ
   (13) 
 
Proposition 2: Emigration of one type of labor must reduce the wage of the non-
emigrating type iff KZ
LY
KYLZ
SX
KXSZ
KZ θθ
θθ
θ
θθθ ~],min[ =<  
Proof:  We have already shown that emigration of skilled workers may lower the wage of 
unskilled workers if sector Z is labor intensive.  Proposition (2) makes use of that 
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information along with (13) to demonstrate that emigration of unskilled workers will also 
lower the return to skilled workers if and only if, the income share of capital in Z is lower 
than the minimum of (12) and (13), both of which must be negative for adverse impact on 
the wage of the non-migrating type. QED. 
 
It is obvious that if KZKZ θθ
~
< and skilled labor emigrates, 
w
wS
 must go up aggravating 
wage inequality, and conversely if the unskilled emigrates 
w
wS must fall reducing wage 
inequality in the process.  It is also to be noted that when Sw goes up and w goes down, r 
must increase.  Interestingly, if both Sw and r go up, then sector X turns unviable 
as XP does not change.  Therefore, the outcome is consistent with the initial conjecture 
that the economy might be left with two sectors only; in this case Y and Z.  Conversely, if 
w and r go up and Sw falls, production of Y must stop altogether.   
 Let us now consider the scenario where the new production structure yields 
similar results as in Marjit and Kar (2005) to the extent that the wage of the non-emigrant 
actually goes up.  It is clear from (11) that 
LY
KY
LZ
KZiffw
θ
θ
θ
θ
>> ,0ˆ
      (14) 
Also,      0ˆˆ <
−
−
= S
KYLZKZLY
SZLY wr
θθθθ
θθ
  (15) 
In this case it is not clear whether Marjit and Kar (2005) type production structure can be 
ruled out because in both set ups r actually goes down.  We claim that if the following 
conditions hold then the said structure will not be the endogenous outcome.       
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KYLZKZLY
SZLY
KX
SX
θθθθ
θθ
θ
θ
−
>
    (16) 
(16) suggests that the decline in r if X and Y are produced, is greater than the decline in r 
when Y and Z are produced. 
In other words,    
KYLZKZLY
KYSZ
LY
KY
KX
SX
θθθθ
θθ
θ
θ
θ
θ
−
<
  (17) 
Condition (17) similarly suggests that wˆ is greater in magnitude when Y and Z are 
produced than when X and Y are produced.  In fact, (16) and (17) guarantee that even if r 
goes down production of X can not be sustained in the new equilibrium and the emerging 
production pattern allows only Y and Z to be produced. 
 Let us now consider the issue of wage distribution or wage inequality.  It is clear 
that when following emigration of skilled labor the unskilled wage goes down in absolute 
terms, wage inequality or wage gap must go up.  But interestingly, even if wˆ  goes up 
(from 12 it means Y, and not Z is labor intensive), it is possible that
w
wS rises.   
From (11),   θ
θθ KYSZ
Sww ˆˆ =    (11)’  
where,  )( KYLZKZLY θθθθθ −= , and using (11)’,  
θ
θθθ KYSZ
S ww
−
=− )ˆˆ(    (18) 
When 0)( <−= KYLZKZLY θθθθθ , it implies, 0ˆ <w and 0)ˆˆ( >− wwS , such that wage 
inequality must increase.  However, if sector Y is labor intensive, then 0>θ , and 
)1()( KZKYKZLYSZLZKYKZLYKYSZ θθθθθθθθθθθθ −−=+−=−  
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= KYKZKYKYLYKZKZKYKYKZLY θθθθθθθθθθθ −=−+=+− )( . (19) 
Therefore, 0)ˆˆ(
<
>
− wwS , iff 0)(
<
>
− KYKZ θθ .     (20) 
(20) allows us to offer a definitive condition on wage inequality subject to skill 
emigration from the country.  From (11) we know that
LY
KYLZ
KZKZiffw θ
θθθθ =>> ~,0ˆ .  
From (20), on the other hand, )/( wwS must go up if KYKZ θθ > .  Comparing the two we 
offer the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: Emigration of skilled workers improves unskilled wage rate but the 
wage gap increases iff ],max[ KY
LY
KYLZ
KZ θθ
θθθ > .    
Proof: See discussion above.  
 
In Marjit and Kar (2005) the only condition that was needed for the wage gap to increase 
was KXKY θθ < .  Since X ceases to be produced in the new structure a low value of KYθ  
relative to KZθ is necessary for wage gap to increase.   
 As referred to earlier, Anwar (2006) uses a model with scale economies and 
variety of intermediate goods to argue that even if capital’s income share is the same 
across sectors, emigration may still increase or decrease the wage gap.  This has reference 
to Marjit and Kar (2005) results that for KYKX θθ = , )/( wwS does not change.   
 Note that, in the extended framework discussed here, )/( wwS may go up or down 
independent of whether KYKX θθ =  because production of X is no longer relevant in a 
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structure where only Y and Z are produced.   
The relevant condition now is given in terms of KYθ and KZθ , and it directly follows 
from (20) that if KZKY θθ = , 0ˆ >w , but 0)ˆˆ( =− wwS .   
 Another possible scenario is where only X and Z are produced.  Note that, for this 
to happen w must rise.  If X continues to be produced then r must fall.  If Y ceases to be 
produced a decline in r must be compensated by a rise in w so that average cost of 
producing Y exceeds YP .   
 If X and Y have to be produced then following must be true: 
                 S
KXLY
SXKY ww ˆˆ
θθ
θθ
=
   (21) 
If instead, X and Z are produced then,  
           
LZ
SSZS
KX
SX
KZ www θ
θ
θ
θθ 1]ˆˆ[ˆ −=
 
Or,   
LZ
S
SZ
KX
SX
KZ
w
w
θ
θ
θ
θθ ˆ][ˆ −=
   (22) 
Therefore, if (X, Z) instead of (X, Y) have to be produced then the following must hold: 
KX
SX
LY
KY
LZ
SZ
KX
SX
KZ θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θθ >− 1][
    
Or,  
LZ
SZ
LY
KY
KZ
KX
SX
θ
θ
θ
θθ
θ
θ
>− ](
    (23) 
(23) implies that similarly as in Marjit and Kar (2005), emigration of skilled workers 
leads to an increase in the wage rate of the unskilled if any of these combinations are 
produced and the corresponding conditions satisfied. 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
 There has been a recent surge in efforts at analyzing the impact of factor mobility 
on factor price inequality in source and destination countries.  Several important 
contributions within the last few years developed theoretical and empirical models to 
explain how wage inequality, primarily, has behaved following increased international 
mobility of skilled and unskilled labor.  Although there is consensus that skilled wage has 
risen more than the unskilled wage in both developed and developing countries, not 
surprisingly the analyses have taken various routes.  .   
 The present contribution not only envelops much of these results but adds another 
dimension, namely the post-emigration production pattern in the source country.  By 
invoking a third sector that uses both skilled and unskilled labor we account for a large 
number of cases where vanishing sectors and wage inequality are joint outcomes of labor 
migration.  This treatment is closer to reality and in sharp contrast with most of the 
previous writings where sector specificity of skill types dominates.  We establish that the 
direction of wage inequality – whether pro-skilled or anti-skilled crucially hinges on the 
income share of capital in the mixed sector in comparison to that in one of the surviving 
sectors.  Possibility of ‘not small’ finite changes as discussed in relation to technical 
progress in Findlay and Jones (2000) applies here with respect to production organization 
in the source country.  Ceteris paribus emigration of skilled workers increases the skilled 
wage rate in the source country.  A rise in skilled wage up to the developed country level 
might lead to flight of capital towards other sectors in the economy.  Consequently, the 
unit cost of production in the skill specific sector may become larger than the unit price 
under perfectly competitive conditions and a finite change in the nature of ‘vanishing’ 
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skilled sector is obvious.  This also opens up a starker possibility where each sector using 
a specific factor might vanish.  
 The effects of emigration on wage inequality offer another set of results where 
skilled wage and unskilled wage may no longer move in the same direction and may no 
longer be considered as snapshots of case-sensitive explanations.  In fact, if the mixed 
sector is relatively more unskilled labor intensive vis-à-vis the unskilled labor specific 
sector, unskilled wage falls in absolute terms and wage inequality rises.  However, if 
absolute reduction in unskilled wage is ruled out by non-fulfillment of this intensity 
assumption, even then wage inequality must go up.  In other words, vanishing sectors and 
increasing wage inequality are both robust when it comes to intensity assumptions, unlike 
some of the previous explanations for rising wage inequality.  In brief, therefore, the 
present contribution not only envelops a set of earlier results but opens up possibilities of 
exploring the effects of factor mobility beyond wage inequality alone.     
Another important avenue that one can explore is the growth implication of 
emigration. If emigration has a negative impact on return to capital, it may have an 
adverse impact on growth. But a positive impact is what we have tried to highlight in this 
paper. It seems that there is some potential in progressing along this line.                    
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